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I. INTRODUCTION
When Diane first met her friend, Sarah, through the Project Kids
Program,' she never anticipated the situation in which she was get-
ting involved. It all started out innocently enough. Diane's role was
to spend time with ten year-old Sarah and to be a friend and a role
model to her. When they first started spending time together, Sarah
lived at home with her mother and her brothers. Now, two years
later, Sarah lives in a foster home. After Sarah was placed in the fos-
ter home, Diane's role began to change. She spent hours at various
meetings discussing the family's reunification plan and making phone
calls as an advocate for Sarah. She never knew what would happen
next. Many times, Diane felt she was waging a personal battle for her
young friend's best interests in the complex world of foster care. In
today's child welfare system, volunteers like Diane are not alone in
having a personal stake in the outcome of a child placement decision.
With all the competing interests involved in a child placement deci-
sion, are the best interests of the child really the controlling factor in
making decisions regarding foster children? The child welfare system
today must deal with many factors that compete with the best inter-
ests of children. Many situations regarding child welfare often find
their way into a court of law, where decisions must be made as to what
type of placement is in the best interests of the child. We would all
like to think that our judicial system would never place other consid-
erations ahead of a child's best interest. These other considerations
should not outweigh the child's best interests. However, this can hap-
pen. Such was the case of a little boy named John T.
In In re Interest of John T.,2 the Nebraska Court of Appeals disap-
proved the plan of the Nebraska Department of Social Services
("DSS")3 to remove a young boy from the home of his foster parents,
1. This scenario is based on the author's own experience as a Project Kids volunteer.
The Project Kids Program is a component of the Parent Aide Support Service,
which is a program supervised by the Nebraska Department of Health and
Human Services. This program utilizes volunteers to provide support to families
in an effort to reduce risk factors that contribute to child abuse and neglect. The
Project Kids component of the program matches a child who needs special help or
attention with a volunteer who provides role modeling, self-esteem enhancement,
and other types of support to the child.
2. 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 538 N.W.2d 761 (1995).
3. The Department of Social Services, now known as the Department of Health and
Human Services, is the state agency responsible for child welfare services in Ne-
braska. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 68-1207 (Reissue 1996). The Department's role in
providing such services is to develop and implement a comprehensive statewide
approach to providing child welfare services and to assure that children are
swiftly moved through the system. See 390 NEB. ADMIN. R. & REGS. 1-002 to -004
(1995). The Department's role in placing children begins when the court has
given custody of the child to the Department or when the parents have volunta-
rily relinquished the child to the Department. When custody is court-ordered,
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one of whom had HIV-AIDS.4 In John T., the court promoted the in-
terests of the foster parents under the guise of seeking the best inter-
ests of the child. This proposition may not be evident in the court of
appeals opinion alone, but becomes apparent through the progression
of the case as a whole. John's best interests were placed behind the
social goal of discouraging discrimination in the judicial process
against an individual with AIDS.
It cannot be disputed that there is widespread discrimination
against individuals with HIV-AIDS.5 Such discrimination has
prompted reforms to protect the rights of people infected with HIV-
AIDS.6 Discouraging discrimination against individuals with this dis-
the Department is authorized to make all decisions about placement, medical and
psychological treatment, and education of the child. If parental rights have been
terminated or relinquished, the Department will make all decisions regarding the
child. See 390 NEB. ADAnN. R. & REGS. 7-001 to -001.01 (1995).
4. The term "HIV-AIDS" will be used throughout this Note to refer to the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and the acquired immune deficiency syndrome
(AIDS). See Abigail English, The HIV-AIDS Epidemic and the Child Welfare Sys-
tem: Protecting the Rights of Infants, Young Children, and Adolescents, 77 IOWA
L. REv. 1509, 1511 n.1 (1992). HIV is the virus that causes AIDS. AIDS is a
disease in which the immune system is severely depressed, causing the body to be
subject to many opportunistic infections and cancers. See Joseph Evall, Sexual
Orientation and Adoptive Matching, 25 FA i. L.Q. 347, 360 n.86 (1991).
5. See Janet L. Dolgin, AIDS: Social Meanings and Legal Ramifications, 14 HOF-
sTRA L. REv. 193, 198-99 (1985)(discussing public fear and panic associated with
AIDS victims and persons in high risk groups for contracting AIDS); Nancy B.
Mahon, Public Hysteria, Private Conflict: Child Custody and Visitation Disputes
Involving an HIV Infected Parent, 63 N.Y.U. L. Ray. 1092, 1092-94 (1988)(dis-
cussing public hysteria and violence against HIV infected people and the discrim-
inatory treatment HIV-infected individuals receive from the public, members of
the clergy, emergency care personnel, government officials, and the judiciary);
John Parry, AIDS as Handicapping Condition-Part I, 9 MENTAL & PHYsIcAL
DIsABIrry L. REP. 402, 402-03 (1985)(citing specific instances of discrimination
against people with AIDS); Lynn E. Sudbeck, Students With AIDS: Protecting an
Infected Child's Right to a Classroom Education and Developing a School's AIDS
Policy, 40 S.D. L. REv. 72, 72-73 (1995)(discussing public fear of AIDS and of
people who are infected with the disease); Robert P. Wasson, Jr., The AIDS Crisis
as an Impetus to Law Reform in the United States and Kenya, 17 SuFFOLK TRANS-
NAT'L L. REV. 1, 10-12 (1994)(discussing irrational fear of AIDS victims); see also
David P. Russman, Alternative Families: In Whose Best Interests?, 27 SUFFOLK U.
L. REv. 33, 58-60 (1993) (discussing association of AIDS with homosexuality re-
suiting in prejudice against the gay community).
6. See English, supra note 4, at 1514-15 (discussing adoption of HIV-AIDS policies
by state child welfare agencies and adoption of national guidelines on HIV-AIDS
by government agencies and professional organizations); Marlene C. McGuirl &
Robert N. Gee, AIDS: An Overview of the British, Australian, and American Re-
sponses, 14 HoFsTRA L. REV. 107, 126-132 (1985)(discussing various state local
reforms prohibiting discrimination against AIDS victims); John Parry, AIDS as
Handicapping Condition-Part II, 10 MENTAL & PHYIsicAL DisABiLrry L. REP. 2,
2-4 (1986)(discussing constitutional, federal, and state law protections for people
with AIDS); Sudbeck, supra note 5, at 74-81 (discussing protections for AIDS-
infected children under federal law).
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ease is a legitimate goal in the judicial and social systems. However,
in a situation like John T.'s, can this be taken too far? Whose inter-
ests are to be given more weight-those of an HIV-AIDS-infected fos-
ter parent or those of the foster child? In the John T. situation, the
fact that the foster mother had AIDS, as opposed to some other termi-
nal illness, tipped the scales in favor of protecting the foster parents'
interests over what was really in the best interests of this child.
This Note first presents the factual background of In re Interest of
John T., as well as the ultimate outcome of the situation, which is not
evident in the court of appeals opinion itself. Next, this Note presents
the legal framework upon which the case can be analyzed. This Note
then analyzes the Nebraska Court of Appeal's opinion in John T., be-
ginning with an analysis of the differences in the rights of biological
families as compared to the rights of foster and adoptive families. The
meaning of the best interests of the child standard is then examined.
The ramifications of interijecting the social and political goal of dis-
couraging discrimination against HIV-AIDS-infected individuals into
a child placement decision are then discussed. This Note concludes by
examining the future implications for the child welfare system arising
from the John T. case and the subsequent federal court suit brought
by the foster parents alleging discrimination by DSS because of the
foster mother's HIV-AIDS status.
II. BACKGROUND
In re Interest of John T.7 was an appeal to the Nebraska Court of
Appeals seeking to reverse an order of the juvenile court. The juvenile
court order approved the DSS plan to remove a three-and-a-half-year-
old boy from the home of foster parents because the foster mother was
HIV-positive. The court of appeals reversed the juvenile court's order,
thereby disapproving the DSS plan.8 However, there is much more to
this case than what is revealed in the court of appeals opinion, making
the story all the more tragic.
John T. was born on December 28, 1991.9 When he was three
months old, DSS placed John in the home of foster parents, Jay and
GayLynn Brummett.1o John was placed in foster care because his
parents could not care for him properly. John's biological mother had
suffered from schizophrenial for over half her life,12 and his biologi-
7. 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 538 N.W.2d 761 (1995).
8. See id. at 100, 538 N.W.2d at 773.
9. See id. at 84, 538 N.W.2d at 764.
10. See id. at 80, 538 N.W.2d at 762.
11. Schizophrenia is a serious mental illness. A schizophrenic may suffer from posi-
tive symptoms, which are the presence of certain phenomena which are not pres-
ent in a normal individual, and negative symptoms, which are the absence of
certain functions which should be present in a normal individual. The specific
620 [Vol. 77:617
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cal father was incarcerated on a sexual assault charge and was also
possibly schizophrenic.13 Because his mother was schizophrenic, John
had a fourteen-percent chance of developing schizophrenia himself.14
If John's father also had schizophrenia, John would have a fifty-per-
cent chance of developing the illness.15
John's placement with the Brunimmetts was a "fos-adopt" place-
ment, a term of art meaning the placement was assumed permanent
and the foster parents would adopt the child when the child became
free for adoption.16 On April 9, 1992, John was adjudicated as a child
without proper support through no fault of his parents, and the biolog-
ical parents later relinquished all rights to John, freeing him for adop-
tion.' 7 At the time of John's placement with the Brummetts, DSS had
a health regulation concerning foster and adoptive parents which
stated that in the case of adoption, the health of the parents should be
maintained until the child reaches the age of majority.'S
The Brummetts first applied to be foster parents in December of
1990, and their performance as foster parents since that time was sat-
isfactory.19 However, when they applied to be foster parents, neither
Jay nor GayLynn Brummett disclosed to DSS that GayLynn Brum-
mett had tested HIV positive in 1989 and was taking AZT, a drug com-
monly taken as treatment for the disease.20 DSS found out about
GayLynn's HIV status through an anonymous report,2 ' and, when
confronted with the information, GayLynn Brummett confirmed the
report.2 2 Mrs. Brummett stated that she did not disclose the informa-
tion because she believed she would be rejected as a foster parent.23
DSS asked the Brummetts to consider changing John's placement
symptoms of schizophrenia include hallucinations, delusions, catatonia, thought
disorder, disturbance of emotion, attentional impairment, and memory failures.
See SCHmoPHRENIA 15, 15-17 (Steven R. Hirsch et al. eds., 1995); see also
CHARLES G. COSTELLO, SMI-roMs OF ScHmZopRENIA (1993)(detailing the various
symptoms of schizophrenia).
12. See In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 84, 538 N.W.2d 761, 764 (1995).
13. See id. at 84-85, 538 N.W.2d at 764-65.
14. See id. at 88, 538 N.W.2d at 766.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 85, 538 N.W.2d at 765.
17. See id. at 80, 538 N.W.2d at 762.
18. See id. at 96, 538 N.W.2d at 770.
19. See id. at 85, 538 N.W.2d at 765.
20. See id.
21. See Appeal Rejected; Foster Mom With AIDS to Get Boy Back, OMAHA WORLD
HERALD, Dec. 15, 1995, at 29 [hereinafter Appeal Rejected].
22. See AIDS Part of Battle to Keep Foster Son Brummetts' Battle, OMAHA WORLD
HERALD, Feb. 19, 1996, at 11 [hereinafter Brummetts' Battle].
23. See In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 96, 538 N.W.2d 761, 771 (1995);
see also Foster Mom With AIDS Dies at 31, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Oct. 26, 1996,
at 28 [hereinafter Foster Mom Dies].
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from fos-adopt to long-term foster care.24 The Brummetts insisted on
adopting John.25
DSS gathered information stating that GayLynn Brummett would
develop AIDS within the next seven years and had no chance of sur-
vival.26 Concerned about the potential impact of losing his mother at
a young age on the schizophrenia in his biological makeup,2 7 DSS
filed a placement change to transfer John to another foster home.28
The transfer was approved by the juvenile court.2 9
John's guardian ad litem appealed the juvenile court order to the
court of appeals. 30 The court of appeals opinion, rendered on October
3, 1995, stated that the DSS plan was not in John's best interests.
The court found that a preponderance of the evidence showed that it
was in John's best interests to stay with the Brummetts. This evi-
dence showed that John had bonded with the Brummetts, had a close
extended family through the Brummetts, that there were no deficien-
cies in John's care, and that there was no risk of John contracting HIV
from Mrs. Brummett through ordinary household contact. 3 1 Even
though the Brummetts had deceived DSS in violation of the health
regulation regarding adoptive parents, 32 the court disapproved the
DSS plan. DSS petitioned the Nebraska Supreme Court for further
review of the case,3 3 but the Court refused.3 4 It appeared that John
would be staying with the Brummetts.
However, one crucial fact not evident in the court of appeals opin-
ion is that John had already been transitioned into a new foster home
in June of 1995 and had been living there since that time.35 Pursuant
to the mandate of the court of appeals, DSS submitted a new plan for
24. See In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 86, 538 N.W.2d 761, 765 (1995).
A long term foster care agreement would have allowed John to remain with the
Brummetts, without adoption, subject to review by DSS and the court every 6
months. See id.
25. See id. at 86, 538 N.W.2d at 766.
26. See id., 538 N.W.2d at 765.
27. See id. at 87, 538 N.W.2d at 766.
28. See id. at 80, 538 N.W.2d at 762.
29. See id. at 81, 538 N.W.2d at 762.
30. See id., 538 N.W.2d at 763.
31. See id. at 85-86, 538 N.W.2d at 765; see also Case Law Development: Zoning,
Housing, & Custody, 20 MENTAL & PHYsicAL DISABILITY L. REP. 90, 94
(1996)[hereinafter Case Law Development].
32. See In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 95-96, 538 N.W.2d 761, 770-71
(1995); see also Case Law Development, supra note 31, at 94.
33. See Petition for Further Review and Memorandum Brief in Support Thereof, In re
Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 538 N.W.2d 761 (1995) (No. A-95-0215);
see also Appeal Rejected, supra note 21.
34. See Appeal Rejected, supra note 21, at 29.
35. See Petition for Further Review and Memorandum Brief in Support Thereof at 6,
In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 538 N.W.2d 761 (1995) (No. A-95-
0215); see also Brummetts' Battle, supra note 22, at 11.
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John in January of 1996.36 This plan stated that it was in John's best
interests to have him remain in the home of the new set of foster par-
ents based on the change in circumstances. 37 The juvenile court is-
sued an order approving the plan.3 8 In response, the Brummetts
moved for a Writ of Mandamus from the district court, ordering the
juvenile court to send the child back to them. The district court denied
the writ,3 9 and the Brummetts then moved for a writ from the Ne-
braska Supreme Court.4o The supreme court ordered the juvenile
court to return John to the Brummetts. 4 1 John was returned to the
Brummetts in March of 1996.42
Although Jay Brummett was able to adopt John in November of
1996, GayLynn Brummett died of AIDS in October 1996, one month
before the adoption was finalized.4 3 Jay Brummett is now suing DSS
in federal court for damages under the Americans With Disabilities
Act, claiming that DSS discriminated against him because his wife
had AIDS.44
III. RELEVANT LAW
The child placement system in the United States is controlled by
the best interests standard: placement of a child should only be car-
ried out to further the welfare of the affected child.45 In Ziebarth v.
36. See Memorandum Brief at 15, In re Interest of John T., No. 49-463 (Lancaster
County Juv. Ct. Jan. 24, 1996).
37. See Brummetts' Battle, supra note 22, at 11; Reply Brief at 5-6, In re Interest of
John T., 49-463 (Lancaster County Juv. Ct. Jan. 26, 1996).
38. See Order for Approval of Placement Change, In re Interest of John T., 49-463
(Lancaster County Juv. Ct. Jan. 26, 1996).
39. See Order, Brummett v. Nebraska Dep't of Soc. Servs., 537-138 (Lancaster
County Dist. Ct. Jan. 29, 1996)(order denying Brummett's petition for
mandamus).
40. See Petition and Motion for Writ of Mandamus, State ex. rel. Brummett v. Thor-
son (No. S-33-960006)(Neb. Jan. 30, 1996)(ordering Juvenile Court Judge Toni
Thorson to comply with the opinion of the Nebraska Court of Appeals).
41. See Order, State ex rel. Brunmmett v. Thorson (No. S-96-178)(Neb. Feb. 23,
1996)(order stating juvenile court judge complied with the writ of mandamus);
Order, State ex rel. Brummett v. Thorson (No. S-96-178)(Neb. Mar. 13, 1996)(or-
der dismissing the case); see also Brummetts' Battle, supra note 22, at 11.
42. See Butch Mabin, Judge Says Man Can Sue Officials in Adoption Case, LnicoL.N
JouRNAL STAR, April 26, 1997, at 1C.
43. See id.
44. See id; see also Foster Mom with AIDS Wins Round in Court, OMAHA WORLD HER-
ALD, May 22, 1996, at 28.
45. See Margaret Howard, Transracial Adoption: Analysis of the Best Interest Stan-
dard, 59 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 503, 503 (1984); see also Lindley v. Sullivan, 889
F.2d 124, 133 (7th Cir. 1989)(holding that state adoption proceedings center on
the best interests of the child, not the desires of potential parents); Collier v.
Krane, 763 F. Supp. 473, 476 (D. Colo. 1991)(recognizing duty of state to serve
best interests of child); In re Adoption of Michelle Lee T., 117 Cal. Rptr. 856, 858
(Ct. App. 1975)(holding that the overriding concern in an adoption case is the
1998]
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Ziebarth,46 the Nebraska Supreme Court provided the following de-
scription of the best interests standard:
Under Nebraska law, the inquiry into providing for the best interests of the
children "includes, but is not limited to, a consideration of the relationship of
the children to each parent and the general health, welfare, and social behav-
ior of the children. We have said that we also look to the moral fitness of the
parents, including their sexual conduct; the respective environments each of-
fers; the emotional relationship between the child and the parents; the age,
sex, and health of the child and parents; the effect on the child as the result of
continuing or disrupting an existing relationship; the attitude and stability of
each parent's character; and the capacity of each parent to provide physical
care and to satisfy the needs of the child."4 7
Such considerations are to be used by the court in determining
whether it is in the best interests of a particular child to be adopted by
particular parents. The health of adoptive parents is a legitimate con-
sideration in determining the best interests of a child according to Ne-
braska law.48 At the time of John's placement with the Brummetts,
DSS had a regulation covering foster parent health, which stated:
An applicant must be in such physical/mental condition that it is reasonable
to expect him/her to be able to fulfill parenting responsibilities. In case of
adoption, health should be maintained to the child's majority. The worker
may request a physician's and/or therapist's report on the health of an appli-
cant if there appears to be a health condition that might affect parenting abil-
ity. A negative report may be the basis for denial of an application at any
point in the home study process. 49
The regulation emphasizes the importance of the foster or adoptive
parents' health as a factor to consider in determining whether it is in
the child's best interests to be placed with certain parents. Further-
more, the DSS regulation regarding the health of foster and adoptive
parents operates like a statutory provision because agency regulations
have the force of statutory law.50 This regulation was particularly im-
portant in John T.
Both foster and adoptive relationships have their origins in state
law. Adoption was unknown to the common law.5 1 The matter of
best interests of the child); Eggleston v. Landrum, 50 So. 2d 364, 366 (Miss.
1951)(recognizing unanimous agreement that the welfare of the child is the pri-
mary consideration in an adoption proceeding); In re Adoption of "E", 279 A.2d
785 (N.J. 1971)(noting that the welfare of the child is the paramount considera-
tion controlling the court's exercise of discretion).
46. 238 Neb. 545, 471 N.W.2d 450 (1991).
47. Id. at 554, 471 N.W.2d at 457 (1991)(quoting McDougall v. McDougall, 236 Neb.
873, 877, 464 N.W.2d 189, 192 (1991)).
48. See id.; Beran v. Beran, 234 Neb. 296, 302, 450 N.W.2d 688, 693 (1990).
49. In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 96, 538 N.W.2d 761, 770 (1995)(quot-
ing 474 NEB. ADMIN. R. & REGS. 4-010.04C (1988)).
50. See Slack Nursing Home, Inc. v. Department of Soc. Servs., 247 Neb. 452, 467,
528 N.W.2d 285, 296 (1995); Sunrise Country Manor v. Nebraska Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 246 Neb. 726, 735, 523 N.W.2d 499, 504 (1994).
51. See In re Ritchie, 155 Neb. 824, 827-28, 53 N.W.2d 753, 755 (1952); see also In re
Adoption of Kassandra B., 248 Neb. 912, 918, 540 N.W.2d 554, 558 (1995).
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adoption is wholly statutory.52 Each state has a statutory scheme
which regulates adoption practice.5 3 Currently in Nebraska, adoption
procedure is set out in a specific statutory plan 5 4 and is also subject to
administrative regulations.55 Potential adoptive parents are subject
to an investigation by the State or other licensed child placement
agency in order to ensure that the placement of the child in the home
is appropriate. 56 Similarly, the foster care relationship is derived
"from a knowingly assumed contractual relation with the State" and is
"an arrangement in which the State has been a partner from the out-
set."5 7 In Nebraska, a foster care home must be licensed and has to
meet certain requirements in order to obtain and keep a license.5 8
In contrast, the biological family has a much different origin than
the foster or the adoptive family. Thus, the biological family has dif-
ferent legal rights. The biological family is not based on a contract or
statutes, but is a distinct human right. "[Tjhe rights to marry and to
procreate biologically are older than any state law, and, for that mat-
ter, older than the Constitution or the Bill of Rights."59 Furthermore,
these rights are "ordinarily to be sought, not in state law, but in in-
trinsic human rights, as they have been understood in this 'Nation's
history and tradition.'"6o Because foster families and adoptive fami-
lies have their origins in state law, while the biological family is con-
sidered an intrinsic human right, there are manifest legal differences
between these types of families.
The legal differences between the biological family and the foster
or adoptive family have been recognized by various courts. In Smith
v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 6 1 the
United States Supreme Court noted the differences between the foster
family and the biological family.
IThere are also important distinctions between the foster family and the nat-
ural family. First, unlike the earlier cases recognizing a right to family pri-
vacy, the State here seeks to interfere, not with a relationship having its
origins entirely apart from the power of the State, but rather with a foster
family which has its source in state law and contractual arrangements. 6 2
52. See In re Ritchie, 155 Neb. 824, 828, 53 N.W.2d 753, 755 (1952).
53. See Evall, supra note 4, at 349.
54. See NEB. Rav. STAT. §§ 43-101 to -116 (Reissue 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
55. See 390 NEB. An mN. R. & REGS. 6-002.01 to 002.15 (1995).
56. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-107 (Reissue 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
57. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equal. and Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
845 (1977).
58. See NEB. Rav. STAT. §§ 43-296, 43-1901 to -1906 (Reissue 1993 & Cum. Supp.
1996); NEB. Anam'. R. & REGS. 6-003.01 to -003.13 (1996).
59. Lindley v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 131 (7th Cir. 1989).
60. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equal. and Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
845 (1977)(quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
61. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
62. Id. at 845.
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These legal differences have also been recognized in several cases
in the federal courts. 63 For example, in Collier v. Krane,6 4 the U.S.
District Court of Colorado addressed the difference between a biologi-
cal and an adoptive family.
The family relationship which lies at the core of this action is an adoptive one.
While the biological family relationship is a recognized and protected interest
in both our Constitution and natural law, the adoptive family relationship dif-
fers in several substantial ways. The adoptive family's rights, like those of the
foster family, arise from state statute. The adoption process is entirely a crea-
ture of state law, and parental rights and expectations involving adoption
have historically been guarded by legislative enactment. 6 5
Because of the manifest legal differences between biological fami-
lies and foster or adoptive families, placement of children in foster or
in adoptive homes is subject to regulation through statutes and the
courts. State courts have recognized that adoptive and foster care re-
lationships are based on state law and that there is no right to adopt
or to become a foster parent. For example, in In re Opinion of the
Justices,66 the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated that "[t]here is
... no such right to adopt [or] to be a foster parent.., as these rela-
tionships are legal creations governed by statute."6 7 This proposition,
as it relates to adoption, was stated most clearly by the Louisiana
Court of Appeals in In re Hughes.6S
There is no inherent right of adoption. It is a creature of the law and exists
only where the law expressly grants it and then subject to the restrictions and
limitations which the law imposes. It may be considered a privilege or a right
bestowed by authority of the state. 6 9
Because the adoption process is regulated by the state, adoption
always involves weighing competing interests. 7 0 The importance of
this weighing and balancing was expressed by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in Lindley v. Sullivan.71
Because of its statutory basis, adoption differs from natural procreation in a
most important and striking way. Adoption always involves the weighing and
balancing of many competing interests. The rights of a couple to adopt must
be reconciled with the state's interest.., in securing ultimately the welfare of
the child. 7
2
63. See Procopio v. Johnson, 994 F.2d 325, 330 (7th Cir. 1993); Lindley v. Sullivan,
889 F.2d 124, 130-31 (7th Cir. 1989); Collier v. Krane, 763 F. Supp. 473, 476 (D.
Colo. 1991); Crim v. Harrison, 552 F. Supp. 37, 39-40 (N.D. Miss. 1982).
64. 763 F. Supp. 473 (D. Colo. 1991).
65. Id. at 476.
66. 530 A.2d 21 (N.H. 1987).
67. Id. at 24.
68. 176 So. 2d 158 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
69. Id. at 161.
70. See Collier v. Krane, 763 F. Supp. 473, 476 (D. Colo. 1991).
71. 889 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1989).
72. Id. at 131 (citations omitted).
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Securing the child's welfare through an adoptive or foster placement is
determined by weighing and balancing interests. The standard for
both agencies and courts handling adoptions is the "best interests of
the child."7T Like these other courts, Nebraska has recognized that
the biological parent-child relationship is a constitutionally protected
interest 74 and that adoption is wholly statutory.75 Based on this legal
framework, In re Interest of John T. can be analyzed.
IV. ANALYSIS OF IN RE INTEREST OF JOHN T.
Child placement law clearly defines the rights of the various par-
ties and articulates the standard by which placement decisions should
be made. However, the fact combination in the John T. case-an
HIV-AIDS-infected foster mother, a child with genetic loading for
schizophrenia, and the deception of the state placement agency by the
foster parents-presented an unusual situation. Although HIV-AIDS
infection has been a factor in numerous court cases involving adop-
tion, visitation arrangements, and custody of children,7 6 and although
much legal literature has addressed the rights of children who are
themselves infected with HIV-AIDS,77 In re Interest of John T. is ex-
ceptional in that no other cases have dealt with an attempt to remove
a foster child from an HIV-infected foster parent who wishes to adopt
the child.78 Thus, this case involves considerations that were not in-
cluded in previous cases. John T. involves much more than the HIV-
AIDS infection of a prospective adoptive parent; it involves important
considerations such as the differences between adoptive or foster fami-
lies and biological families, as well as the meaning of the term "best
interests of the child." John T. is a significant case because it illus-
trates how social and political considerations, such as protecting indi-
viduals with AIDS from discrimination, can be interjected into a child
placement decision and outweigh the child's best interests. Because of
the unusual facts, as well as societal pressure to halt discrimination
73. Evall, supra note 4, at 349.
74. See Uhing ex rel Jones v. Uhing, 241 Neb. 368, 373, 488 N.W.2d 366, 370 (1992).
75. See In re Ritchie, 155 Neb. 824, 827-28, 53 N.W.2d 753, 755 (1952); see also In re
Adoption ofKassandra B., 248 Neb. 912, 918, 540 N.W.2d 554, 558 (1995)(holding
that the matter of adoption is wholly statutory in Nebraska).
76. See In re Adoption of Johnson, 612 N.E.2d 569 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); Stewart v.
Stewart, 521 N.E.2d 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup.
Ct. 1988); Jane W. v. John W., 519 N.Y.S.2d 603 (Sup. Ct. 1987); Steven L. v.
Dawn J., 561 N.Y.S.2d 322 (Faro. Ct. 1990).
77. See, e.g., English, supra note 4; Briar McNutt, The Under-Enrollment of HIV-
Infected Foster Children in Clinical Trials and Protocols and the Need for Correc-
tive State Action, 20 Am. J.L. & MED. 231 (1994); Parry, supra note 6; Sudbeck,
supra note 5.




against AIDS victims, the court made several errors in deciding this
case.
A. The Court Did Not Appropriately Apply a Balancing of
Interests Test in John T. by Failing to Recognize the
Manifest Legal Differences Between Biological
Families and Foster or Adoptive Families
One of the most striking differences between John T. and other
cases dealing with custody or visitation by an HIV-AIDS-infected par-
ent is that previous cases deal with an HIV-AIDS-infected biological
parent.7 9 This left the court of appeals with only cases involving bio-
logical families to consider in rendering its decision in John T. The
court discussed several cases "involving parents, children, and
[AIDS],"8o in which HIV-AIDS infection was held insufficient as
grounds for precluding visitation with a child by the infected parent or
for removing custody from the infected parent.S1 The court used the
reasoning of these cases as part of the basis for its decision to disap-
prove the DSS plan. The court admitted that these cases involve "cus-
todial or visitation rights of natural parents, whereas the instant case
involves whether it is in the best interest of a child to stay with his
foster parents, one of whom has AIDS."82 Although it acknowledged
that there is a difference between the previous cases and John T., the
court provided no analysis of the significance of these differences.83
The court overlooked the fact that in dealing with biological families, a
fundamental right is involved, whereas in dealing with foster or adop-
tive families, a balancing of interests test must be used. These differ-
ences cannot be ignored when considering the court's attempt to
79. See Stewart v. Stewart, 521 N.E.2d 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988)(mother moved for
termination of father's visitation rights because father had AIDS); Doe v. Roe,
526 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. 1988)(maternal grandparents sought custody from
custodial father and moved for order compelling father to undergo involuntary
AIDS test); Jane W. v. John W., 519 N.Y.S.2d 603 (Sup. Ct. 1987)(mother opposed
father's application for visitation with child because father had AIDS); Steven L.
v. Dawn J., 561 N.Y.S.2d 322 (Fain. Ct. 1990)(father moved for change of custody
because children's custodial mother HIV-infected).
80. In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 98-99, 538 N.W.2d 761, 771-72
(1995).
81. See id.
82. Id. at 99, 538 N.W.2d at 772.
83. The only recognition the court gave to the difference between biological families
and adoptive families was a short analysis that a biological parent has superior
rights to a child over that of a proposed adoptive parent. The court recognized
that the situation faced in John T. "is not like the 'adoption' cases" because John's
biological parents were not asserting any rights in this case. See In re Interest of
John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 93, 538 N.W.2d 761, 769 (1995). However, the court
then proceeded to analogize the John T. situation to cases involving biological
families without providing any analysis of the differences between the rights of
biological families as opposed to those of foster or adoptive families. See id.
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analogize cases involving HIV-AIDS-infected biological parents to the
John T. situation.
From the opinion itself, it may appear that a consideration of the
rights of different parties is not needed. However, an analysis of
whose rights are affected and what those rights are makes a difference
in this case because of the need to apply a balancing of interests test.
Not only did the court need to consider whether moving John to an-
other foster home was in his best interests, but the court also needed
to consider that if the transition plan was disapproved, the Brum-
metts would be adopting John. Because adoption was involved in the
situation, the competing interests of the parties should have been
taken into account. In failing to appropriately apply a balancing of
interests test, the court veiled a decision based on social and political
considerations under the guise of seeking the child's best interests.
In John T., the interests to be considered were John's best inter-
ests on one hand, and protecting the Brummetts' interest in being
adoptive parents on the other hand. Mrs. Brummett's HIV-AIDS in-
fection, as well as John's genetic loading for schizophrenia, would be
factors in this balancing test. By failing to first define the rights of the
parties and to give appropriate weight to each, the court did not apply
a balancing test in John T. The competing factors in this case were
not viewed appropriately in light of the facts.
B. The Brummetts' Interest in the Fos-Adopt Relationship Is
Not Equivalent to the Biological Parent-Child
Relationship Because There Is No Fundamental
Right to Adopt or to Provide Foster Care
In applying a balancing test, a court must give the appropriate
weight to the interests of the foster parents. In order to do this, the
court must first recognize the rights the foster parents possess. In at-
tempting to define the rights of the foster parents, the court mistak-
enly analogized the John T. situation to child custody and visitation
cases involving HIV-AIDS-infected biological parents. Custody or vis-
itation cases involving HIV-AIDS-infected biological parents may
seem an appropriate analogy to the situation posed by John T. on the
surface. However, the differences between adoptive or foster families
and biological families must be taken into account when making such
a comparison. Although there are some similarities between the rela-
tionships, a distinction must be made between biological families and
foster or adoptive families, which was not made in John T.
This distinction is important to the analysis of this case because,
although there is a fundamental right to marry and raise children,84
there is no fundamental or absolute right to adopt or to provide foster
84. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
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care.8 5 Indeed, adoption is a privilege.8 6 Courts have also held that
prospective adoptive parents have no protected liberty interest in the
children they are seeking to adopt.8 7 Likewise, foster parents do not
have an expectation or entitlement to adopt a foster child by the mere
placement of a child in their home.8 8
The differences in the rights possessed by biological families and
those of foster or adoptive families provide a distinction between John
T. and other cases involving HIV-AIDS-infected biological parents.
There is no inherent right to adopt or to provide foster care, but there
is a fundamental right to raise one's own biological children. "[T]he
biological family relationship is a recognized and protected interest in
both our Constitution and natural law."8 9 Therefore, HIV-AIDS-in-
fected biological parents seeking custody of or visitation with their
children are basing their claims on a fundamental right which cannot
be taken away from them because they are infected with a disease.
Taking these differences into account, the situation faced in John
T. is very different than the cases involving biological parents. The
HIV-AIDS-infected biological parents have a fundamental right to
raise their children. The Brummetts had no fundamental right to
adopt John. This distinction makes a difference in the balancing of
interests which should have occurred in this case. The HIV-AIDS-in-
fected foster or adoptive parent's interests are not equivalent to those
of an HIV-AIDS-infected biological parent because of the differing na-
ture of each relationship. The Brummetts' interest in adopting John
should not be given weight equal to that given to the HIV-AIDS-in-
fected biological parents in the cases discussed by the court. The court
gave the Brummetts' interest in the fos-adopt relationship too much
weight by failing to make an analysis of these differences.
Any interest the Brummetts had in the foster care relationship and
potential adoptive relationship does not rise to a fundamental right
like those of the biological families in the cases cited by the court of
appeals. Therefore, the court erred in analogizing this case to cases
involving biological parents with HIV-AIDS without giving considera-
ble weight to the differences in the rights involved in each type of rela-
85. See Collier v. Krane, 763 F. Supp. 473, 476 (D. Colo. 1991) (concluding there is no
fundamental right to adopt); Eggleston v. Landrum, 50 So. 2d 364, 366 (Miss.
1951)(stating there is no absolute right of adoption); In re Opinion of the Justices,
530 A.2d 21, 24 (N.H. 1987)(stating there is no right to adopt or become a foster
parent).
86. See Eggleston v. Landrum, 50 So. 2d 364, 366 (Miss. 1951); In re Adoption of"E",
271 A.2d 27, 29 (N.J. Essex County Ct. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 279 A.2d
785 (1971).
87. See Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 513-14 (7th Cir. 1982); Crim v. Harrison, 552
F. Supp. 37, 41 (N.D. Miss. 1982).
88. See Crim v. Harrison, 552 F. Supp. 37, 41 (N.D. Miss. 1982).
89. Collier v. Krane, 763 F. Supp. 473, 476 (D. Colo. 1991).
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tionship. By treating these relationships as essentially equal, the
court over-emphasized the interest of the foster parents. Because
there is no fundamental, natural, or inherent right to adopt or become
a foster parent, it is clear that the Brummetts had no right to have
John remain in their home. In spite of this, the court placed the
Brummetts' interest in the foster care relationship on equal footing
with the interests of biological parents.
In spite of the differences between biological families and foster or
adoptive families, decisions involving these relationships are all con-
trolled by the same standard: the best interests of the child.90 It must
be remembered that even though the same standard controls all three
relationships, decisions regarding biological families involve a funda-
mental right, but decisions regarding foster and adoptive families in-
volve weighing and balancing of competing interests. Taking this into
account, decisions regarding foster or adoptive families cannot be de-
cided in the same way as those involving biological families, even
though the same standard governs both. Instead of applying a balanc-
ing test, the court refused to recognize the significance of the differ-
ences between biological families and adoptive or foster families. The
court stated that "because the determinative standard is the same, we
are unable to give the lack of a biological connection between the fos-
ter parents and John any meaningful force when assessing the child's
best interests."9 1 Refusal to recognize the differences between biologi-
cal families' rights and foster or adoptive families' rights resulted in
the court's skewed application of the best interests standard.
The Brummetts' interests in this situation were given priority over
John's best interests. It is improper to place the interests of parents
or potential parents ahead of the interests of the child when making a
placement decision. The Nebraska Supreme Court stated in In re In-
terest of Stoppkotte92 that the primary consideration in such cases is
the "best interests of the child, not that of the parents."93 When the
State makes a placement decision, the child's interests govern that
decision. "State adoption proceedings center upon the best interests of
the child, not the desires, however intense, of potential parents to add
to their family by adoption."94 In order to understand how a court
should balance the interests of the foster parents and the interests of
90. See In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 99, 538 N.W.2d 761, 772 (1995);
see also In re Interest of Jorius G., 249 Neb. 892, 546 N.W.2d 796 (1996) (best
interests standard used regarding foster children); DeVaux v. DeVaux, 245 Neb.
611, 514 N.W.2d 640 (1994)(best interests standard governs custody case be-
tween biological parents); Yopp v. Batt, 237 Neb. 779,467 N.W.2d 868 (1991)(best
interest standard used in adoption case).
91. In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 99, 538 N.W.2d 761, 772 (1995).
92. 210 Neb. 1, 312 N.W.2d 454 (1981).
93. Id. at 7, 312 N.W.2d at 457.
94. Lindley v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 133 (7th Cir. 1989).
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the child, the meaning of the term "best interests of the child" must be
explored. This leads to an examination of the best interests of the
child standard and how it should have been applied in John T.
C. The Best Interests of the Child Standard and the Court's
Problematic Application of this Standard in John T.
There is unanimous agreement that the welfare of the child is the
primary consideration in an adoption proceeding.95 Although John T.
was not an adoption proceeding itself, it cannot be said that adoption
of John by the Brummetts should not have been a concern. The origi-
nal placement was fos-adopt, and if the plan to move John to another
foster home was disapproved, the court knew that the Brummetts
would seek to adopt John thereafter. The court's statements about
John witnessing Mrs. Brummett's death, which would not happen un-
less John was returned to the Brummetts and adopted by them, cer-
tainly indicate that the court contemplated that John would be
adopted by the Brummetts after the court disapproved the DSS
plan.96 This makes the standard used in an adoption proceeding an
appropriate consideration.
The overriding concern in an adoption proceeding is supposed to be
the best interests of the child. However, the best interests standard
itself contains several competing interests which allow other political
and social considerations to enter child placement decisions.97 Fur-
thermore, many features of adoption practice come from an era in
which the needs of the potential adoptive parents were considered the
paramount interest.98 Thus, other interests can easily be interjected
into the best interests standard and overrule the true best interests of
the child.
Although it is clear that the best interests of the child control an
adoption proceeding, determining exactly what those best interests
are can be difficult. The court of appeals itself recognized that the best
interests standard is "by its very nature subjective" and "eludes pre-
cise definition."99 The best interests of the child is an elusive stan-
dard for several reasons.' 00 The meaning of "the best interests of the
child" varies from state to state.lO' Furthermore, this standard
grants judges broad discretion in making decisions regarding child
95. See Eggleston v. Landrum, 50 So. 2d 364, 366 (Miss. 1951).
96. See In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 92-93, 538 N.W.2d 761, 769
(1995)(discussing possible impact on John of witnessing foster mother's death).
97. See Howard, supra note 45, at 503.
98. See Evall, supra note 4, at 349.
99. In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 94, 538 N.W.2d 761, 769 (1995).
100. See Mahon, supra note 5, at 1109.
101. See id.
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placement.O2 Because the best interests standard is subjective and
grants judges broad discretion, the competing factors within the stan-
dard itself are not always given their appropriate weights.
There are several problems with the court's determination of
John's best interests. First the court did not adequately consider the
effects GayLynn Brummett's health condition would have not only on
Mrs. Brummett herself, but on John and Mr. Brummett as well. Sec-
ondly, the court did not give the appropriate weight to the significance
of the foster parents' deception in obtaining the placement of this
child. Lastly, but perhaps most importantly, the court's decision was
based on outdated information, and the change in circumstances in
this case would have significantly impacted the court's best interests
analysis. John's best interests were not given their proper weight in
relation to the interests of the foster parents.
The court of appeals based its analysis of John's best interests on
the testimony of several expert witnesses. This testimony resulted in
a battle of the experts, with the court having to decide which experts
to believe. Dr. Ann Evelyn, who performed a psychiatric evaluation of
John, and Dr. George Williams, a child psychologist, recommended
that John remain with the Brummetts.1 O3 Both experts indicated that
it would be harder for John to undergo a placement change than to
endure the death of Mrs. Brummett.1 o4 Dr. John Donaldson, a psychi-
atrist, recommended that John be transitioned to a new set of foster
parents.1 0 5 Dr. Donaldson opined that the concealment of Mrs. Brum-
mett's HIV-AIDS diagnosis indicated that the Brummetts were in de-
nial of the seriousness of the diseaseXO6 and that the demands placed
on both Mr. and Mrs. Brummett as a result of Mrs. Brummett's illness
would make it very difficult for the Brummetts to meet John's
needs. 0 7 After considering the expert testimony, the court found that
there was "more credible evidence against the plan to remove John
than there is in support of the plan." 0 8 In so doing, the court did not
give proper consideration to several factors involved in determining
John's best interests.
102. See Russman, supra note 5, at 35.
103. See In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 88-90, 538 N.W.2d 761, 767
(1995).
104. See id.
105. See id. at 87-88, 538 N.W.2d at 766.
106. See Brief of Appellee at 7-8, In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 538
N.W.2d 761 (1995) (No. A-95-0215).
107. See id. at 7.
108. In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 95, 538 N.W.2d 761, 770 (1995).
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The health of the potential adoptive parents is one thing to take
into consideration when determining the best interests of a child.09
The DSS health regulation for foster or adoptive parents in effect at
the time stated that a health condition affecting parenting ability or a
condition that indicates that a parent will not live until the child
reaches the age of majority are factors that may result in denial of an
application to be a foster or adoptive parent." 0 AIDS surely qualifies
as a health condition that affects parenting ability and would also im-
pact upon the whether the parent's health can be maintained until the
child reaches the age of majority. AIDS not only affects, but destroys
the health of the infected individual. A person with AIDS is subject to
many debilitating or lethal opportunistic infections and cancers." 1
HIV-AIDS can affect nearly all systems of the body.112 Oral and den-
tal disease, pulmonary disease, liver disease, anemia, renal disease,
and various skin diseases are just some of the illnesses from which
AIDS patients commonly suffer.113 AIDS patients are very suscepti-
ble to various viral, bacterial, and fungal infections." 4 Malignancies
such as Kaposi's sarcoma, Non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, and central ner-
vous system lymphoma are also commonly associated with AIDS.115
A person with AIDS may also suffer from AIDS dementia, which af-
fects the AIDS patient's cognitive abilities, such as concentration,
memory, and ability to think clearly." 6 AIDS dementia can eventu-
ally result in more serious psychiatric problems such as agitation, hal-
lucinations, and paranoid delusions." 7 AIDS is not only debilitating,
but it is fatal."s This means that not only would Mrs. Brummett's
illness affect her ability to parent John, but that Mrs. Brummett
would die before John reached the age of majority. This is exactly the
kind of scenario that the health regulation was designed to prevent.
The effects of the foster mother's health were not properly consid-
ered by the court of appeals. AIDS has been described as a disease
109. See Ziebarth v. Ziebarth, 238 Neb. 545, 554, 471 N.W.2d 450, 457 (1991); McDou-
gall v. McDougall, 236 Neb. 873, 877, 464 N.W.2d 189, 192 (1991); Beran v.
Beran, 234 Neb. 296, 302, 450 N.W.2d 688, 693 (1990).
110. See 474 NEa. ADMIN. R. & REGS. 4-010.04C (1988); see also In re Interest of John
T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 96, 538 N.W.2d 761, 770 (1995).
111. See Evall, supra note 4, at 360 n.86.
112. See FRANcINE COURNOS & NICHOLAs BAKALAR, AIDS AND PEOPLE WITH SEVERE
MENTAL ILLNESS 76 (1996).
113. See id. at 77-84.
114. See id. at 82.
115. See id. at 84.
116. See id. at 61-63.
117. See id; see also Brief of Appellee at 6-7, In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App.
79, 538 N.W.2d 761 (1995) (No. A-95-0215).
118. See Wasson, supra note 5, at 7.
634 [Vol. 77:617
FOSTER PARENTS AND AIDS
that makes life "nasty, brutish and short."1 1 9 The court was aware
that, although she had no symptoms as of August 1993,120 GayLynn
Brummett's HIV-AIDS infection would eventually affect her
health.121 However, the case contains little discussion of the terrible
effects the disease would have on Mrs. Brummett's health. Further-
more, not only would the disease affect Mrs. Brunmmett's ability to
care for John, but Mr. Brummett's ability to parent, also. Dr. Donald-
son's opinion indicated that as Mrs. Brummett became increasingly
ill, the disease would reduce the amount of support available to John
from Mr. Brummett. 122 Based on the wide spectrum of diseases to
which a person with AIDS is susceptible,1 23 it is not difficult to see
how this disease would impact not only the health of the infected per-
son, but be draining to the person's spouse as well. The fact that the
parenting ability of both parents would be affected by Mrs. Brum-
mett's illness weighs heavily against allowing the child to remain with
the Brummetts. The evidence indicated that Mrs. Brummett would
die while John was a young child and that the trauma of her death
could impact on John's genetic loading for schizophrenia. Considering
Mrs. Brummett's health condition and John's genetic history, the
Brummetts were not equipped to raise John. "A couple has no right to
adopt a child it is not equipped to rear. .. ."124 The foster mother's
health condition should have been a major factor against allowing
John to remain with the Bruimmetts, but was instead de-emphasized
by the court.
The fact that Mrs. Brummett would eventually die of a disease that
causes the body to "rapidly deteriorate toward inevitable death,"'25
and that this illness and death would be traumatic for John and drain-
ing to Mr. Brummett should have been a significant factor in this case.
Instead, the court tried to downplay the health aspects of Mrs. Brum-
mett's HIV-AIDS infection. "It is our task," the court stated, "to put
119. Leonard Orland & Sue L. Wise, The AIDS Epidemic: A Constitutional Conun-
drum, 14 HoFsTRA L. REv. 137, 138 (1985).
120. See In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 90, 538 N.W.2d 761, 767 (1995).
121. See id. at 90, 538 N.W.2d at 768 (doctor's testimony that Mrs. Brummett's prog-
nosis is poor and that she will die from AIDS). Even though asymptomatic, an
HIV-infected person is not unaffected by the disease. The disease is not dormant
during the asymptomatic period, which is the period after the person is diagnosed
HIV-positive, but before a diagnosis of AIDS is made. The virus is actively repli-
cating at high levels during this phase. An asymptomatic HIV-infected person
may suffer from central nervous system infection, aseptic meningitis, dementia,
and other infections and diseases. See CouRuos & BAKALAR, supra note 112, at
60-63, 76. This demonstrates that Mrs. Brummett's health would be affected by
her HIV infection, even though she was currently asymptomatic.
122. See In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 88, 538 N.W.2d 761, 766 (1995).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 112-117.
124. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200,
1205 (5th Cir. 1977).
125. Orland & Wise, supra note 119, at 138.
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aside the fact that the foster mother has AIDS."126 Furthermore, the
court attempted to de-emphasize the particularly horrible type of
death associated with AIDS. The court emphasized that Mrs. Brum-
mett at that time had full capability to parent John, and that her
ability to parent "is compromised by virtue of her illness, which is only
true at an uncertain point in the future."12 7 This makes it sound as if
Mrs. Brummett's parenting ability may never be affected by her ill-
ness, especially if medical advancements helping AIDS victims were
to be made. Furthermore, the court tried to disassociate Mrs. Brum-
mett's disease from the health regulation by stating that "DSS does
not have a specific policy on AIDS, and other than may be inferred
from the [health] regulation, there is no evidence about what would
have been done with the [Brummetts'] application if [Mrs. Brum-
mett]'s health status had been fully disclosed." 128
In addition to downplaying Mrs. Brummett's health status, the
court attempted to cast this situation as something that occurred by
chance. The court stated that "[1life is indeed uncertain, and no child
is guaranteed that he or she will proceed through childhood... with
his or her parents healthy or even alive .... We know that parents
suffer and die from illness, and their children observe this and suffer
with their parents."12 9 This makes it sound as if this situation was
completely unexpected by the Brummetts. However, this was simply
not a case where a child was adopted by parents and later one of them
was stricken with a fatal disease. The evidence indicated that this
situation was produced purposely by the Brummetts through their de-
ception of DSS.
This leads to a second problem with the court's best interests anal-
ysis. The court did not properly weigh the significance of the decep-
tion practiced by the Brummetts and the impact of such deception on
John. The general moral fitness and the attitude and stability of the
parent's character are things to take into account when determining
the child's best interests. 130 The Brummetts' conscious deception,
designed to have John placed in their home, has implications about
the Brummetts' moral fitness and character. The health regulation in
effect at the time stated that when placing a child with adoptive par-
ents, the health of the parents should be maintained until the child
reaches the age of majority. 13 1 This indicates that had DSS known
126. In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 100, 538 N.W.2d 761, 772 (1995).
127. Id. at 97, 538 N.W.2d at 771.
128. Id. at 96, 538 N.W.2d at 771.
129. Id. at 100, 538 N.W.2d at 773.
130. See Ziebarth v. Ziebarth, 238 Neb. 545, 554, 471 N.W.2d 450,457 (1991); McDou-
gall v. McDougall, 236 Neb. 873, 887, 464 N.W.2d 189, 192 (1991); Beran v.
Beran, 234 Neb. 296, 302, 450 N.W.2d 688, 693 (1990).
131. See 474 NEB. ADMIN. R. & REGS. 4-010.04C (1988); see also In re Interest of John
T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 96, 538 N.W.2d 761, 770 (1995).
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about Mrs. Brummett's true health status, John would not have been
placed with them as a fos-adopt placement.132 The written applica-
tion process for foster parenting is such that disclosure of this infor-
mation would have occurred had the Brummetts been truthful.133
The foster parents made it a point not to disclose Mrs. Brummett's
HIV-AIDS infection because they knew they would not have a child
placed with them for adoption if that information was known to
DSS.134
The court's analysis regarding the deception practiced by the foster
parents does not consider what this deception indicates about the fos-
ter parents' character. First, the court recognized that the foster par-
ents deceived DSS and that "[tihe end result of this litigation is that
John will have one of two very difficult life experiences." 135 The court
also recognized that, "absent the dishonesty" by the Brummetts, the
court would not have to decide "which alternative is 'less bad' for
John."136 Even after these recognitions, the court stated that the de-
ception is not necessarily against the child's best interests, that there
is no evidence that the deception adversely affects John, and that us-
ing the deception to determine the outcome of the case would be put-
ting aside John's best interests.137 This reasoning contradicts itself.
The court's reasoning is not only contradictory, but it indicates dis-
regard for the seriousness of the deception by the foster parents.
First, it cannot be said that the deception did not adversely affect John
because the deception was the very reason that John was in this situa-
tion. Second, the fact that the Brummetts lied in order to obtain a
placement of a fos-adopt child indicated a lack of concern on the part
of the Brummetts for the best interests and the future of the child.
The Brummetts could not have had John's best interests in mind
when they applied to be fos-adopt parents, knowing that Mrs. Brum-
mett would become ill and die of AIDS and that John would be sub-
jected to seeing her die of a terrible illness at a young age. Although
132. This does not, however, indicate that the Brummetts would have been denied the
opportunity to serve as foster parents. As long as Mrs. Brummett's health did not
limit her parenting ability, she could still be a foster parent. DSS asked the
Brunmetts to change Jobn's placement from fos-adopt to long-term foster care,
which indicates that DSS did not deny the Brummetts all opportunity to serve as
foster parents, but found their adoption of John problematic because of the im-
pending death of Mrs. Brummett and the impact of her death on John's genetic
loading for schizophrenia. See In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 87,
538 N.W.2d 761, 766 (1995).
133. See In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 95-96, 538 N.W.2d 761, 770
(1995).
134. See id. at 96, 538 N.W.2d at 771 (1995); see also Foster Mom Dies, supra note 23,
at 28; Brummetts' Battle, supra note 22, at 11.
135. In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 93, 538 N.W.2d 761, 769 (1995).




the court acknowledged that the Brummetts had been dishonest,138
the court failed to consider the implications of this deceit. Dr. Donald-
son was the only expert who considered the implications of the Brum-
metts' deceit.13 9 Obviously, the court sided with the other two experts
who did not consider the implications of this deceit. The Brummetts
wanted a child and lied in order to get what they wanted, regardless of
what that meant for the future of the child. The Brummetts' actions
in obtaining this placement indicate self-interest, rather than the best
interests of the child they were attempting to adopt. These indica-
tions were never considered by the court.
The final problem with the court's decision is that it was based on
outdated information. The decision did not consider the fact that John
had already been removed from the Brummett home and transferred
to another foster home at the time of the opinion.1 40 Had this infor-
mation been considered, the outcome of the case could have been en-
tirely different. The court primarily based its decision to disapprove
the DSS plan on expert testimony that it would be more traumatic to
move John than to let him witness GayLynn Brummett's death. The
court viewed the DSS plan as a "punitive notion," meaning that the
purpose of taking John away was to punish the foster parents for their
dishonesty. 14 1 However, the fact that John had already been removed
from the Brummetts and placed in a new foster home largely negates
this view.
When considering the significant change in circumstances in this
case, it must be taken into account that the best interests of the child
is a relative standard.142 As stated in In re Interest of Michelle Lee
T.,143 "[t]he question is not whether a particular set of circumstances
is in the best interest[s] of the child, but whether a particular set of
circumstances relative to an alternate set of circumstances is in the
best interest[s] of the child."144 Considering that John had already
been transferred to another foster home makes this question impor-
tant. John could either stay in his new placement with two healthy
parents or be returned to the Brummetts where he would witness
Mrs. Brummett's death and possibly spend the rest of his life without
a mother. The court decided that John should not be removed from
138. See id. at 95-96, 538 N.W.2d at 770.
139. See id. at 96, 538 N.W.2d at 771; see also Petition for Further Review and Memo-
randum Brief in Support Thereof at 5, 8, In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App.
79, 538 N.W.2d 761 (1995) (No. A-95-0215).
140. See Petition for Further Review and Memorandum Brief in Support Thereof at 6,
In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 538 N.W.2d 761 (1995) (No. A-95-
0215).
141. See In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 97, 538 N.W.2d 761, 771 (1995).
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the Brummetts because experts testified that it would be more trau-
matic to move John than to let him witness Mrs. Brummett's death.
Once John had already been moved, the question of whether or not
John should be removed from the Brummetts was moot, and the ex-
pert testimony on which the court based its decision became inapplica-
ble. Nebraska law recognizes that a material change in circumstances
that affects the best interests of the child can be a basis for a change in
custody.145 DSS petitioned the supreme court for further review of
the case in November of 1995, setting forth the change in circum-
stances.146 However, the supreme court refused to review the decision
and the case was ordered back to the juvenile court. 147
Once ordered back to the juvenile court, evidence was presented
that, as a result of John already being transitioned into another foster
home, one of the two experts originally opposing the DSS plan to re-
move John from the Brunimmetts changed his opinion.148 The guard-
ian ad litem who originally brought the action also changed his
opinion.149 Both Dr. Williams and the guardian ad litem agreed that
it was now in John's best interests to remain in the home of the second
set of foster parents. 150 Although these changes could not be consid-
ered by the court of appeals, 151 they could have been considered by the
supreme court. In spite of this, the supreme court ordered the juvenile
court judge to send John back to the Brunmetts.152
After examining the problems with the court of appeals opinion
and acknowledging the progression of the case after that point, in-
quiry can be made into why the Nebraska Supreme Court ordered
John back to the Brummetts in spite of these changed circumstances.
Knowing that John was already removed from the Brummetts and
145. See Miles v. Miles, 231 Neb. 782, 784, 438 N.W.2d 139, 141 (1989).
146. See Petition for Further Review and Memorandum in Support Thereof at 6, In re
Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 538 N.W.2d 761 (1995) (No. A-95-0215).
147. See Appeal Rejected, supra note 21, at 29; see also Brummetts' Battle, supra note
22, at 11.
148. See Order for Approval of Placement Change at 3-5, In re Interest of John T., 49-
463 (Lancaster County Juv. Ct. Jan. 26, 1996)(order for approval of placement
change which states Dr. George Williams changed his opinion to recommend that
the child remain with the new set of foster parents).
149. See id.; see also Stipulation, In re Interest of John T., 49-463 (Lancaster County
Juv. Ct. Jan. 24, 1996)(stipulation indicating guardian ad litem's position that it
was in the child's best interests to remain with the new set of foster parents.)
150. See Order for Approval of Placement Change at 3-5, In re Interest of John T., 49-
463 (Lancaster County Juv. Ct. Jan. 26, 1996)(order for approval of placement
change which states Dr. George Williams changed his opinion to recommend that
the child remain with the new set of foster parents and guardian ad litem was in
agreement with this position).
151. See In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 82, 538 N.W.2d 761, 763 (1995)
(in reviewing a final order of the juvenile court, the standard of review is de novo
on the record).
152. See supra note 40; see also Brummetts' Battle, supra note 22, at 11.
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that the effects of such removal were what the court of appeals was
trying to prevent by disapproving the DSS plan, why would the
supreme court order John to be transitioned, yet again, back to the
Brummetts? The answer is that the social goal of protecting individu-
als with HIV-AIDS from discrimination was interjected into this case
from the beginning and was the basis for the outcome of the situation.
D. The Effect of Interjecting Societal and Political Interests
into a Child Placement Decision-Why AIDS Was a
Factor in the Outcome of This Case
The court's view of this case as an "AIDS case" is very significant to
the outcome of the situation. Because of discrimination against AIDS
victims, there is now a movement to stop such discrimination.15 3 The
fact that John T. involved AIDS, as opposed to some other terminal
illness, is important because the social goal of preventing discrimina-
tion against AIDS victims was interjected into this case. The reforms
and policies sparked by the AIDS epidemic indicate that ending dis-
crimination against HIV-AIDS-infected individuals is an important
social and political interest. It cannot be said that avoiding discrimi-
nation against an HIV-AIDS infected individual was not a factor in
this case. Avoiding discrimination against a foster parent with AIDS
was an underlying consideration in the case, which undercut the im-
portance of considering John's best interests.
The fact that the foster mother had AIDS-as opposed to some
other terminal illness-runs through the entire case. Although the
court tried to downplay the seriousness of the effects the disease
would have on Mrs. Brummett's ability to parent John, references spe-
cific to AIDS, which are not applicable to other terminal illnesses,
were made throughout this case. The court of appeals made much of
the fact that John would not have any higher risk of contracting AIDS
from remaining in the Brummett home.154 If GayLynn Brummett
had cancer instead of AIDS, the fact that John had no higher risk of
getting cancer by living in the household would not have even been
discussed. Cancer is known to be a debilitating and terminal disease,
much like AIDS.155 However, we seldom hear of discrimination
against cancer victims in the news, as we do of discrimination against
AIDS victims. With the knowledge that HIV-AIDS is not spread
through casual contact, why are transmission routes even a considera-
tion? The information about the low risk of John contracting AIDS
was purposely interjected because this was an "AIDS case." If AIDS
153. See supra note 6.
154. See In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 85-86, 98, 538 N.W.2d 761, 765,
771-72 (1995).
155. See Dolgin, supra note 5, at 195-96.
[Vol. 77:617
FOSTER PARENTS AND AIDS
was not a significant factor in this case, HIV-AIDS transmission
routes would not have been discussed.
The considerable symbolism associated with AIDS and its "heavy
baggage of meanings"' 5 6 also played a role in this case. AIDS has
been linked with homosexuality and intravenous drug use, both of
which are often seen as contrary or destructive to normal family life
and socially approved forms of sexuality. 157 A diagnosis of AIDS often
results in "a 'diagnosis' of social marginality."5 8 The court used the
important social ramifications of AIDS to downplay the fact that the
foster parents engaged in conscious deception to gain custody of John.
In the opinion, the court stated that "[wie cannot say it is per se
against the child's best interests that his parents have hidden a health
condition which generates from some quarters a degree of discrimina-
tion, hysteria, and paranoia."1 59 The court implied that the foster
parents should not have to take responsibility for their deception sim-
ply because AIDS is a disease that generates negative social reactions.
This rationalization allowed the court to minimize the significance of
the foster parents' deception. There is a need to diminish the signifi-
cance of the deception because it is a very strong factor against al-
lowing the Brunmmetts to adopt John. The deception indicates the
Brummetts' concern for their own self-interests over John's best inter-
ests. The court highlighted the social ramifications of AIDS in order
to avoid having to address the foster parents' deception-the very
thing that instigated this whole situation and which can only be
blamed on the foster parents. In order to further the social and polit-
ical goal of avoiding discrimination against persons with AIDS, the
court used a rationalization to decrease the significance of the foster
parents' deception.
Not only was the preference for the foster parents' interest running
throughout the court of appeals opinion, but the social and political
considerations involved in discouraging discrimination against indi-
viduals with disabilities were also interjected in this case. The Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973160 provides that disabled individuals cannot be
treated differently by institutions receiving public funding.161 The
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990162 expands the protections
provided in the Rehabilitation Act to the private sector.i 6 3 AIDS is
considered a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act.164
156. Id. at 193 n.1.
157. See id. at 197.
158. Id. at 201 (emphasis omitted).
159. In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 96, 538 N.W.2d 761, 771 (1995).
160. See 29 U.S.C-. §§ 701-796 (1995 & West Supp. 1997).
161. See Sudbeck, supra note 5, at 74-75.
162. See 42 U.S.C-.A §§ 12101 to 12213 (1995 & West Supp. 1997).
163. See Sudbeck, supra note 5, at 80.
164. See id. at 80-81.
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The influence of Mrs. Brummett's AIDS status and that AIDS
qualifies as a disability is evident in the position taken by John's
guardian ad litem in his brief to the court of appeals. 16 5 First of all, it
must be kept in mind that a guardian ad litem is appointed to protect
the interests of the child, not to represent the foster parents.16s How-
ever, this did not prevent the guardian ad litem from making a
lengthy argument that the DSS health regulation violated Mrs. Brum-
mett's right to equal protection. This argument states that the health
regulation results in "disparate treatment" for potential adoptive par-
ents who are terminally ill and also "generates disparate treatment to
healthy persons who are married to persons suffering from a terminal
illness."167 Furthermore, it was argued that the health regulation
"clearly creates a category on the basis of an inherently suspect char-
acteristic."168 The guardian ad litem stated that because "carriers of
HIV or AIDS are considered to have a disability,"169 "Mrs. Brummett
is in a category of persons protected under the law."170 This argument
obviously advocates for the foster parents' interests. This is a clear
indication that even the guardian ad litem, who was supposed to be
representing John's best interests, actually assisted in interjecting the
foster parents' interests into this case.
Although the court did not specifically address whether the health
regulation violated Mrs. Brummett's constitutional rights, the court
obviously read the brief and was aware the argument was made.171
Even though the constitutional rights of the foster parents were not
specifically addressed, the existence of this argument, especially when
brought by the person who was supposed to represent John's interests
only, is evidence that AIDS as a disability was an underlying consider-
ation in the case and was an influence on the court's decision.
The reaction the case received in the press also indicates the push
for ending discrimination against individuals with HIV-AIDS. In the
media, the case was represented to be purely about "AIDS phobia."172
The Brummetts' attorney is quoted in one newspaper article as say-
ing, "[tihis is AIDS on trial."173 Such statements show the impact of
165. See Brief of Appellant at 32-38, In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 538
N.W.2d 761 (1995) (No. A-95-0215).
166. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-272.01 (Reissue 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
167. Brief of Appellant at 33, In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 538 N.W.2d
761 (1995) (No. A-95-0215).
168. Id. at 35.
169. Id. at 36.
170. Id. at 37.
171. See In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 79, 82, 538 N.W.2d 761, 763 (1995)
(specifically stating that the guardian ad litem asserts that the health regulation
is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution).
172. See Brummetts' Battle, supra note 22.
173. Id. at 11.
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AIDS on this case. This case should not have been about "AIDS on
trial." It should have been about what was best for a child. The
Brummetts were seen as victims "who fought to adopt their foster son,
even though one of them was dying of AIDS."i74 Meanwhile, DSS was
seen as a state bureaucracy that was "targeting an HIV positive per-
son."' 7 5 The Brummetts were even honored by the American Civil
Liberties Union as Civil Libertarians of the Year in 1996.176 The
Brummetts were held up as crusaders for the rights of disabled per-
sons, while DSS was seen as an agency that discriminates against in-
dividuals with disabilities. The true issue in this case was AIDS, not
the best interests of the child.
Almost no one would say that we should allow discrimination
against HIV-AIDS infected persons or other disabled persons. Also,
most would not say that individuals with certain handicaps should be
barred from adopting or raising children.' 7 7 However, the disability
of a potential adoptive parent coupled with a reluctance to discrimi-
nate against disabled individuals should not overshadow what is truly
in the child's best interests. In the John T. situation, GayLynn Brum-
mett was more than just disabled-she was dying. Protecting the
"rights" of Mrs. Brummett as an AIDS victim resulted in a great detri-
ment to John-having to be shifted, not once, but twice, between two
sets of foster parents. Furthermore, Mrs. Brummett had no right to
adopt John in the first place. In a case like this, what was best for
John should have been the primary consideration, not what would
best further the societal and political interests in preventing AIDS
discrimination. We don't want to discriminate, but we need to be dis-
criminating in choosing adoptive parents.' 78
E. Future Implications of the John T. Decision and Jay
Brunmmett's Suit in Federal Court
Jay Brummett is suing DSS in federal court, alleging that DSS dis-
criminated against him because his wife had AIDS.1 79 The basis for
the suit is the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation
Act,' 8 0 which prohibit discrimination against disabled individuals.
Throughout the country, it is standard practice to require full medical
174. Judge Lets Suit Over Adoption Proceed Under Disabilities Act, OMAHA WORLD
HERALD, April 27, 1997, at 4B.
175. Foster Mom Dies, supra note 23.
176. See Paul Hammel, Foster Parents, Chambers Receive Honor From ACLU, OMIAHA
WoRLD HERALD, October 18, 1996, at 28.
177. See In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36 (1979)(citing various instances where
handicapped people successfully adopted and parented children).
178. See Stephanie Mencimer, HIV Tests for Adoptive Parents?, LEGAL TnBUs, Febru-
ary 20, 1995, at 6.




examinations for adoptive parents.1 8 1 If Jay Brummett is successful
in his suit in federal court, will that mean that in order to receive
federal funding, state social service agencies cannot have any health
regulations that could be seen as discriminating against disabled indi-
viduals? If state agencies can no longer have health regulations in
order to avoid discrimination against disabled individuals, while pri-
vate agencies are still allowed to have health regulations, would that
not result in children who are placed through state agencies being at
higher risk of placement with a seriously ill adoptive parent than
those who are placed through private agencies? The current DSS reg-
ulations on adoption contain no provisions concerning the health of
prospective adoptive parents.1 S2 This indicates that John T. may
have already had its greatest impact on the future of adoptions
through state agencies in Nebraska. If the best interests of the child
is really the primary consideration in an adoption proceeding, "dis-
crimination" to some extent should be allowed in choosing the parents
who will adopt the wards of this state.
V. CONCLUSION
The aftermath of In re Interest of John T. leaves us with a difficult
question. Should protecting HIV-AIDS-infected adults from discrimi-
nation be more important than protecting the rights of children in the
child welfare system? The interests of both of these groups are highly
important. However, in a situation such as the one faced in John T.,
the motivations of the individual parties must be taken into considera-
tion. John was just an infant, incapable of making any decisions,
when he was placed with the Brummetts. Much like Diane, our Pro-
ject Kids Volunteer, who did not know what to expect when her friend
Sarah was placed in foster care, John could never have anticipated the
ramifications his foster care placement would have on his future.
John had no choice in the decisions that were being made for him.
Similarly, DSS had no way of knowing that it was placing John in a
potentially damaging situation. On the other hand, the Brummetts
were adults, fully capable of making their own decisions. They were
aware of Mrs. Brummett's health status for several years before they
tried to adopt John. They were the only people in this situation who
had insight into what the future would bring for the child they wished
to adopt. They were the only ones who knew where the events they
had set in motion could possibly lead.
Looking at the relative positions of these parties, who could best
have prevented this situation? The answer must be the Brummetts.
They were the only ones who knew the truth about Mrs. Brummett's
181. See Mencimer, supra note 178, at 6.
182. See 390 NEB. ADMIN. R. &. REGS. 6-002 to -022.15 (1995).
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health condition and what this could mean for the future of any child
they tried to adopt. In spite of this knowledge, the Brummetts chose
to pursue their own self-interests in adopting a child at the expense of
that child. How can it be said by the court that this deception did not
adversely affect John? The answer must lie in the fact that Mrs.
Brummett had AIDS, and no court wants to be viewed as discriminat-
ing against someone with this disease.
Because children and adults are not on equal footing, the interests
of an AIDS-infected adult must yield to the best interests of a child.
While the adult has the decisionmaking power, the child is defense-
less. Children in the custody of the state foster care system must be
protected from future situations like the one in which John T. found
himself. It is the state's duty to serve the best interests of children,
and these interests cannot be subordinate to the interests of HIV-
AIDS-infected adults.
As stated by the court of appeals, life is indeed uncertain.
Although we cannot escape this fact, the uncertainty of life should not
be exacerbated by deception. When foster parents deceive a child
placement agency in order to obtain placement of a child, this decep-
tion must be considered in deciding whether these parents are fit to
raise the child. When the deception is not discovered until after the
child has been placed with the family, does that make the deception
any less detrimental to the child? Once the child has been removed
from the foster parents and placed in a stable home environment, it is
wrong for a court to place the interests of the foster parents ahead of
the best interest of the child and to order the child back to the original
foster parents. This subjects children to being shifted back and forth
between foster homes.
For foster children, life is more uncertain than for most. This un-
certainty affects not only children, but others who have a personal
stake in the outcome of child placement decisions, such as biological
parents, foster parents, and people involved in the child welfare sys-
tem, like our Project Kids Volunteer, Diane. Two years after befriend-
ing Sarah, Diane sees the decisions that are made regarding Sarah
and tries to make sure that those decisions are in Sarah's best inter-
ests. But what about children who don't have someone looking out for
them? The interests of the adults involved in a child placement deci-
sion should not be paramount to the best interests of the child. Chil-
dren's best interests will not be served by courts that favor the
interests of adults over those of children.
In a situation like the one faced in John T., there are important
competing interests on both sides. Protecting HIV-AIDS-infected indi-
viduals is a legitimate goal that must be pursued. However, consider-
ing this goal in the context of the John T. case, one simple fact must be
remembered-adults can make their own decisions and children can-
19981
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not. This is why protecting HIV-AIDS infected adults from discrimi-
nation must yield to the best interests of children in cases like John T.
We want all children to have the best life can offer them. That is
what Diane wants for Sarah. Did we not want that for John T.? Do
we not want that for all foster children? In light of In re Interest of
John T., we must ask ourselves if that goal is truly being pursued in
our courts.
Jenny L. Plager '99
